Biting the Hands That Feed: Corporate Charity and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by Demas, Reagan R.
American University International Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 3
2014
Biting the Hands That Feed: Corporate Charity
and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Reagan R. Demas
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Demas, Reagan R. "Biting the Hands That Feed: Corporate Charity and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." American University




BITING THE HANDS THAT FEED: 
CORPORATE CHARITY AND THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
REAGAN R. DEMAS* 
I. INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AND 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ...................... 336 
II. DONATIONS AND THE FCPA: THE LAW .......................... 339 
A. DOJ’S 2012 GUIDANCE ........................................................ 340 
B. DOJ OPINION RELEASES ...................................................... 342 
1. 1995 Opinion Release .................................................... 342 
2. 1997 Opinion Release .................................................... 343 
3. 2006 Opinion Release .................................................... 344 
4. 2009 Opinion Release .................................................... 345 
5. 2010 Opinion Release .................................................... 346 
C. CASES ................................................................................... 348 
III. PRACTICAL APPLICATION: WHEN IS A DONATION 
IMPROPER? ............................................................................. 350 
A. DONATIONS TO UNKNOWN CHARITIES OR DONATIONS 
MADE IN THE FACE OF “RED FLAGS” ................................... 350 
B. DONATIONS TO BONA FIDE CHARITIES ................................. 351 
1. When There Is a “Special Connection” Between a 
Foreign Official and the Recipient Entity...................... 352 
2. When a Foreign Official Has a “Special Interest” in 
the Recipient Entity ....................................................... 352 
3. When the Donation Is “Made at the Request of” a 
Foreign Official ............................................................. 353 
 
 *  Reagan Demas is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Baker & 
McKenzie, where his practice focuses on anti-corruption and Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) advice and investigations globally, as well as cross-border 
business transactions involving sub-Saharan Africa. He has significant experience 
working on behalf of companies and investors conducting business in developing 
countries. He received his B.A. from Stanford University and J.D. from Harvard 
Law School. 
  
336 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:2 
4. When the Donation Is Made “in Honor of” a Foreign 
Official ........................................................................... 353 
5. When the Donation Is “Made to Influence” a Foreign 
Official with Regard to a Business Matter .................... 353 
C. DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROBLEMATIC 
DONATION ............................................................................ 354 
1. Quid Pro Quo ................................................................. 354 
2. Payment Accruing to Foreign Official vs. Other 
Benefit ........................................................................... 355 
3. Corrupt Intent ................................................................ 357 
IV.  AVOIDING PROBLEMATIC DONATIONS: 
PRACTICAL POINTS FOR COMPANIES TO CONSIDER 
IN CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY PROGRAMS................ 359 
V. SUGGESTED CHANGES IN U.S. FCPA 
ENFORCEMENT REGIME VIS-À-VIS CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DONATIONS ................................. 361 
A. SAFE HARBOR FOR DONATIONS MADE IN GOOD FAITH ....... 362 
B. IMMUNITY FOR DONATIONS TO RECIPIENTS ON EMBASSY 
LISTS .................................................................................... 364 
C. EXCEPTION FOR INDUSTRY POOLING OF CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS ................................................................... 365 
D. SUPPLEMENTAL PUBLISHED GUIDANCE FROM 
REGULATORS ........................................................................ 366 
VI.    CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 368 
 
“Doing what’s right isn’t the problem. It is knowing what’s right.” 
Lyndon B. Johnson1 
I. INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
AND THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
U.S. and multinational companies operating in developing 
countries recognize the importance of contributing to the local 
communities in which they operate. The importance of donations 
related to corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) to local 
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communities is growing, and today companies and shareholders alike 
recognize CSR contributions as important and valuable corporate 
goals.2 In addition, local communities around the world where these 
companies operate and profit expect these companies to give back to 
the local communities in some way.3 
The obligation to contribute to the local communities in which 
they operate covers companies working in a wide variety of 
industries around the developing world. Extractive industries (oil, 
gas, and mining) face unique pressures due to the perceived 
environmental impact of their operations and the political realities 
involved in the extraction and export of valuable natural resources,4 
but other industries face similar pressures to contribute. 
Pharmaceutical and medical companies are encouraged to contribute 
to local community health by donating products or services, and even 
companies operating in the retail supply chain are encouraged to 
contribute to, for example, occupational health and safety initiatives 
in manufacturing countries.5 The collapse of a garment factory in 
Bangladesh in 2013 and the call thereafter for clothing retailers to 
contribute more funds to ensure the safety of manufacturing facilities 
provides a recent example of how failure to respond to local requests 
to give back to the community can result in damaging and unwanted 
 
 2. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 57 
(2004) (identifying fifty-five companies promoting CSR). 
 3. See, e.g., id. at 56 (identifying the Stride Rite Company, which is praised 
for its corporate citizenship, opting to move its manufacturing jobs outside of low-
income domestic areas to foreign countries with lower employment costs). 
 4. See, e.g., Jedrzej George Frynas, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil 
and Gas Sector, 2 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 178, 181 (2009), available at 
http://jwelb.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/178.full.pdf+html?sid=601a8c0a-d53e-
4b04-9508-efc38f709931 (describing the Exxon-Valdez oil tanker accident, anti-
Shell protests in Nigeria, and alleged BP human rights abuses in Colombia). 
Political forces can exploit the environmental impact of extractive operations on 
local populations, heightening the importance of those operations’ tangible 
contributions to local populations. See David B. Spence, Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk, 
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 69–70 (2011). 
 5. See Howard Husock, The Bangladesh Disaster and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, FORBES (May 2, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
howardhusock/2013/05/02/the-bangladesh-fire-and-corporate-social-responsibility/ 
(noting that Walmart gave $1.8 million for the training of Bangladesh plant 
managers in safety techniques following a factory fire). 
  
338 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:2 
media attention.6 Pressures to donate to local communities are further 
enhanced in some countries by existing xenophobic tensions between 
foreign companies and local governments.7 
Actual examples of risky donation scenarios companies have 
recently faced include the following: 
 the requirement that a company construct an orphanage in one 
West African country and use a specific contractor or supplier 
selected by a local official to do so; 
 a request that a company donate several tons of concrete and 
trees for the paving and landscaping of a municipal square in 
Mexico prior to receiving an operational license; 
 a request by local tribal officials in sub-Saharan Africa that a 
company contribute to a community fund managed by those 
tribal officials; and 
 the requirement that a company donate to a local development 
fund in Asia in exchange for tangible business support. 8 
Contributions to local governments and communities are not 
prohibited by the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).9 
Nevertheless, some such contributions can fall within the FCPA’s 
prohibitions, and companies face practical challenges to ensure such 
contributions do not lead to FCPA liability. Identifying connections 
between recipient charities or communities and local officials can be 
difficult; additionally, demands that companies donate to specific 
projects or development funds further exacerbate uncertainty and 
risk. While in principle the FCPA only applies to payments made to 
 
 6. Id.  
 7. See Yuriy Humber, Chalco Targeted as Mongolia Seeks to Limit State 
Deals, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-
16/chalco-targeted-as-mongolia-seeks-to-limit-state-deals.html; Devon Maylie, 
World News: Mining Debate Rattles South Africa – Unions Renew Push for 
Nationalization as Companies Plan Cuts to Cope with Slowing Demand, WALL ST. 
J., May 16, 2013, at A8. 
 8. Confidential client scenarios. 
 9. FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. & SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N 16 (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf [hereinafter FCPA Resource 
Guide]. The FCPA technically applies only to payments made to officials, not to 
governments. Id. at 20. 
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officials and does not apply to payments made to governments, 
FCPA enforcement trends show that regulators take a broad view of 
what constitutes a payment to a foreign official, and even intangible, 
non-financial benefits can be viewed as actionable under the 
statute.10 Under the current enforcement regime, a fine line separates 
legitimate CSR contributions from “corrupt” payments, where 
regulators can view donations as a way to “please” local officials 
with potential ability to influence the company’s business.11 
Despite the uncertainty, there are practical ways for companies to 
manage the risk of CSR contribution regimes.12 Nevertheless, lack of 
clarity on when CSR contributions can lead to FCPA liability 
remains, despite the publication of the U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) FCPA Guidance (the “Guidance” or the “DOJ’s 2012 
Guidance”) in November 2012.13 This article addresses the practical 
challenges facing companies operating in developing countries today 
in the corporate-philanthropy arena. Part II provides an overview of 
the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance, DOJ opinion releases, and FCPA 
enforcement actions as they relate to CSR contributions and 
donations. Part III discusses the practical challenges companies face 
given the lack of clarity in the current FCPA legal and enforcement 
regime, and Part IV maps out practical ways companies can mitigate 
risk in their CSR contribution programs. Finally, Part V proposes 
alterations to the FCPA enforcement regime that would provide 
greater clarity to corporations while still maintaining robust 
prohibitions on corrupt payments to foreign officials. 
II. DONATIONS AND THE FCPA: THE LAW 
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions14 prohibit a corrupt offer, 
 
 10. See Final Judgment, SEC v. Schering-Plough, No. 04-0945 (D.D.C. 2004); 
see also Complaint, SEC v. Schering-Plough, No. 04-0945, 1 (D.D.C. 2004) 
[hereinafter Complaint, Schering-Plough] (prosecuting payments made to a bona 
fide charity founded by a foreign official). 
 11. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4.  
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, Foreword. 
 14. The FCPA is comprised of two sets of provisions: (1) the anti-bribery 
provisions and (2) the accounting provisions. See The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). The accounting provisions set broad 
requirements for companies to keep and maintain accurate books and records and 
put in place appropriate internal controls to ensure their books are accurate. See 
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promise, or payment of anything of value to a foreign (non-U.S.) 
official, directly or indirectly, made for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining business.15 U.S. regulators have taken a broad jurisdictional 
view of the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA; the law applies to 
U.S. persons or entities, U.S.-listed companies, agents of U.S. 
companies, and aiders and abettors of U.S. companies.16 The FCPA 
provision further applies to non-U.S. companies that take an “act in 
furtherance” of a violation in the U.S.17 
The FCPA itself does not specifically address the question of CSR 
contributions or donations. However, the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance does 
touch upon the topic, as do several DOJ Opinion Releases from the 
past eight years. In addition, two FCPA settlements (including one 
from 2013) have included CSR contributions or donations as conduct 
charged under the FCPA donations to charities. 
A. DOJ’S 2012 GUIDANCE 
The DOJ’s Guidance on the FCPA, published in November 2012, 
briefly addresses donations as well as whether CSR contributions 
could fall within the statute’s ambit.18 There, the DOJ notes that 
“[t]he FCPA does not prohibit charitable contributions or prevent 
corporations from acting as good corporate citizens.”19 The DOJ 
further emphasizes that “[t]he FCPA prohibits payments to foreign 
officials, not to foreign governments.”20 However, the Guidance 
cautions that, despite the fact that the FCPA does not technically 
apply to payments made to governments or governmental entities, 
 
FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 38–39 (focusing primarily on the anti-
bribery provision, which is the provision that regulates the giving of improper 
payments to foreign officials). 
 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1; Reagan R. Demas, Moment of Truth: Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and Critical Altercations Needed in Application of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 26 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 315, 330 (2011) [hereinafter Demas, Moment of Truth] (giving a 
more detailed overview of the specific provisions of the FCPA); Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 
fraud/fcpa/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) [hereinafter FCPA Overview].  
 16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (defining jurisdictional view of anti-bribery 
provision in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
 17. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 4. 
 18. Id. at 19. 
 19. Id. at 16. 
 20. Id. at 20. 
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“companies contemplating contributions or donations to foreign 
governments should take steps to ensure that no monies are used for 
corrupt purposes, such as the personal benefit of individual foreign 
officials.”21 
The Guidance fails to provide additional detail on whether such a 
personal benefit in the context of donations must be tangible, or if 
other non-financial benefits could qualify. For example, could the 
donation and construction of a school in a key voting district, 
requested by a politician running for reelection, qualify as something 
of “value” given for a corrupt purpose? In this hypothetical, the 
politician would receive no direct financial or in-kind benefit from 
the school construction, but any politician would tell you that votes 
in a key swing district are certainly something of “value.”22 
Something of “value” normally refers to tangible financial or in-kind 
benefits.23 However, U.S. courts have broadly construed the concept 
of a “thing of value” when analyzing other criminal statutes to 
include intangible things.24 
After discussing several cases and opinion releases that have 
touched upon charitable giving and the FCPA,25 the Guidance 
concludes that “[l]egitimate charitable giving does not violate the 
FCPA.”26 Unfortunately, the Guidance does not provide significant 
guidance or detail as to when a contribution is or is not “legitimate.” 
Instead, it concludes that avoiding FCPA liability in this context 
“merely requires that charitable giving not be used as a vehicle to 
conceal payments made to corruptly influence foreign officials.”27 
In short, the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance alerts companies operating in 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Whether this hypothetical would be viewed by U.S. regulators as a 
potential violation of the FCPA would likely hinge on whether the official had the 
authority and ability to benefit the business of the contributing company, and 
whether the official actually provided or promised a business advantage to the 
company in exchange for the school contribution.  
 23. Justin Serafini, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 
731 n.60 (2004). 
 24. See John P. Giraudo, Charitable Contributions and the FCPA: Schering-
Plough and the Increasing Scope of SEC Enforcement, 61 BUS. LAWYER 135, 152 
n.143 (2005) (citing United States v. Sheker, 618 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 25. See infra Parts II.B–C.  
 26. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19. 
 27. Id. 
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developing jurisdictions that, while donations themselves are not 
prohibited by the FCPA and payments to governmental entities (as 
opposed to officials) are not covered by the FCPA, such payments 
can be diverted and end up accruing to the personal benefit of an 
official. Such diversion could lead to FCPA liability for the 
contributing company. Companies should therefore take tangible 
steps to look beyond the recipient of donations and CSR 
contributions and confirm that such contributions do not end up 
lining the pockets of individual officials. Fortunately, some of these 
steps have been specifically delineated in DOJ FCPA Opinion 
Releases. 
B. DOJ OPINION RELEASES28 
While the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance does not address donations or 
charitable contributions in great detail, approximately one out of 
seven of the DOJ FCPA Opinion Releases since 1993 have related to 
the subject of CSR contributions.29 Opinions released in 1995, 1997, 
2006, 2009, and 2010 all involved companies seeking a commitment 
from the DOJ that proposed donations or charitable contributions 
would not be actionable under the FCPA. 
1. 1995 Opinion Release 
In 1995, the DOJ approved a proposed $10 million contribution 
for construction of a medical facility in South Asia.30 The donation 
was to be made “through a charitable organization incorporated in 
 
 28. DOJ Opinion Releases are mechanisms by which companies or individuals 
can disclose proposed transactions or payments to the Department and request that 
the DOJ confirm in advance that such payments will not be viewed as a violation 
of the FCPA. The Opinions are narrowly tailored, apply only to the specific facts 
presented by the requesting company, and are typically conservative in their 
approach, requiring companies to take significant protective measures in exchange 
for the DOJ’s commitment that such transactions will be immune from later 
prosecution. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST. (July 1, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/frgncrpt.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter FCPA Opinion Procedure].  
 29. Approximately thirty-four FCPA Opinion Releases, five of which related to 
charitable contributions. Fraud Section Home Index to Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/index/ (last visited Nov. 25, 
2013).  
 30. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 95-01 (Dep’t of Justice Jan. 11, 
1995) [hereinafter FCPA 1995 Review]. 
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the United States” and thereafter be passed on to a public company in 
the South Asian nation.31 The DOJ confirmed that it would not “take 
any enforcement action with respect to the prospective donation” 
based on three key factors. First, the company planned to require all 
officers of the recipient U.S. charity and the South Asian public 
company to sign certifications confirming the funds would not be 
used in violation of the FCPA.32 Second, the company represented 
that no individuals affiliated with the charity and South Asian 
recipient company would be “affiliated with the foreign 
government.”33 Finally, the company represented that it would 
“require audited financial reports from the U.S. charitable 
organization, accurately detailing the disposition of the donated 
funds.”34 
While the 1995 DOJ Opinion confirms that “implementing 
safeguards and conducting due diligence on a donee organization are 
good ways of minimizing the risk of FCPA violations,”35 
extrapolation of the 1995 Opinion to other scenarios is limited 
because the donation in that case was made via a U.S. charity, not 
commonly an option for companies making CSR contributions in the 
field.36 Moreover, depending on the amount of the contribution, 
obtaining audited financial reports detailing the disposition of 
donated funds can be impractical for companies donating to 
charitable causes in developing nations. 
2. 1997 Opinion Release 
In a 1997 release, the DOJ stated it would not take enforcement 
action against a planned $100,000 donation by a U.S.-based utility 
company.37 The donation, which was to be made towards the 
construction of a school in an Asian country, would not cover the full 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Keith M. Korenchuk et al., Guarding Against Anti-Corruption Problems in 
Overseas Philanthropic Activities, TAXATION OF EXEMPTS 19, 22 (2011), available 
at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Arnold&PorterLLP_ 
TaxationOfExempts_November-December2011.pdf. 
 36. See FCPA 1995 Review, supra note 30, at 1. 
 37. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 97-02 (Dep’t of Justice 
Nov. 5, 1997) [hereinafter FCPA 1997 Review]. 
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cost of the school and was to be made “directly to the government 
entity responsible for the construction and supply of the proposed 
elementary school.”38 The company confirmed that it would require a 
written agreement with the government certifying that the funds 
would be used only for the school construction and setting other 
conditions to ensure the school would be built, staffed, and 
appropriately utilized.39 Nevertheless, the DOJ made clear that its 
approval of the donation was based on the fact that the contribution 
was to be made “directly to a government entity—and not to any 
foreign government official,” and therefore “the provisions of the 
FCPA do not appear to apply to this prospective transaction.”40 The 
basis for this 1997 Opinion is not fully consistent with the DOJ’s 
2012 Guidance, which makes clear that contributions to a 
government entity could lead to liability under the FCPA where 
insufficient diligence and monitoring is conducted by the 
contributing party, and some or all of the contributed funds are 
passed on to an official.41 
3. 2006 Opinion Release 
In 2006, a U.S. corporation (headquartered in Switzerland) asked 
the DOJ to bestow its blessing on the corporation’s proposed plan to 
donate to a fund to reward officials who vigorously enforced anti-
counterfeiting laws in an African country.42 The proposed $25,000 
donation would be distributed by the African state government as 
financial incentives for customs officials who catch and turn away 
counterfeit products, many of which were counterfeits of products 
made or distributed by the company requesting the DOJ opinion.43 
In deciding that it would not take enforcement action relating to 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Compare id. (arguing that the FCPA did not apply because the donation 
went to a government entity, not an official), with FCPA Resource Guide, supra 
note 9, at 19 (expanding possible FCPA liability if funds can be misused, 
regardless of the recipient of the donation, and highlighting the number of due 
diligence and monitoring measures required to lessen the likelihood of an FCPA 
violation).  
 42. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 06-01, 1 (Dep’t of Justice 
Oct. 16, 2006).  
 43. Id. 
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the proposed donation, the DOJ noted “a number of procedural 
safeguards” the requestor planned to implement, including (but not 
limited to): 
 payment of the funds by electronic transfer; 
 written confirmation from the African state that the funds were 
received in a legitimate account; 
 the requesting company would have no part in choosing agents 
who receive a financial award from the fund, but would ensure 
that the funds were used only for the designated purpose and 
only received by agents who were eligible according to 
predetermined criteria; 
 the requesting company would “monitor the efficacy of the 
incentive program” and discuss periodic refinements with the 
African state; 
 the African state would retain records for five years relating to 
distributed funds and would permit the requesting company full 
access to those records.44 
In addition, the DOJ noted that the requesting company agreed 
that all items deemed counterfeit by customs agents in the country 
would be examined by the company to confirm they were, in fact, 
counterfeit.45 While the opinion did not label this safeguard as a 
necessary requirement for DOJ approval, it would seem impractical 
in most company donation scenarios for the donating party to 
monitor every activity performed by a receiving charity to ensure 
funds were appropriately spent. 
Given the unique nature of the proposed donation outlined in the 
2006 request,46 applying the terms of its approval to other donations 
or charitable gifts provides limited assistance to companies seeking 
clear guidance regarding CSR contributions under the FCPA. 
4. 2009 Opinion Release 
In 2009, a U.S. company requested and received DOJ approval for 
 
 44. Id. at 1–2. 
 45. Id. at 2. 
 46. Id. at 1–2. 
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the donation of medical devices valued at $1.9 million to the 
government of a foreign country.47 The foreign government asked the 
requesting company to donate sample devices to government health 
centers because the government was unfamiliar with the specific 
devices and would need to be familiar with any devices that the 
government might purchase in the future for subsidized sales to 
patients.48 The DOJ cited a number of controls the U.S. company had 
in place to ensure the donated devices would be provided to eligible 
candidates via a predetermined, subsidized medical device 
program.49 The DOJ also noted that there was “no reason to believe 
that [a foreign official] will personally benefit from the donation.”50 
In the end, the DOJ sanctioned the proposed donation because it 
would “fall outside the scope of the FCPA in that the donated 
products [would] be provided to the foreign government, as opposed 
to individual government officials.”51 The DOJ’s reasoning here was 
more consistent with its 2012 Guidance than was its 1997 opinion, in 
that the DOJ noted there were assurances that the devices would 
ultimately be given to “patient recipients selected in accordance with 
specific guidelines.”52 The 2009 opinion does not, however, advise 
what assurances would have been sufficient in this case, or the 
minimum controls that would be expected for typical corporate 
donations where the organized, predetermined guidelines that existed 
in the medical device program are absent. 
5. 2010 Opinion Release 
In its most recent opinion release on the subject in 2010, the DOJ 
sanctioned the proposed $1.42 million grant from a U.S.-based 
nonprofit to a recipient local microfinance institution in a Eurasian 
country.53 Local authorities compelled the grant as part of the 
nonprofit’s attempt to reorganize its local subsidiary into a local 
 
 47. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 09-01, 2 (Dep’t of Justice Aug. 
3, 2009) [hereinafter FCPA 2009 Review]. 
 48. Id. at 1.  
 49. Id. at 2. 
 50. Id. at 3.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 10-02, 2, 7 (Dep’t of Justice 
July 16, 2010) [hereinafter FCPA 2010 Review].  
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financial institution, and the recipient was to be chosen from a “short 
list of institutions” provided by local regulators.54 In addition, a 
foreign official sat on the Board of the local entity that was 
ultimately selected as recipient of the funds.55 
Despite the fact that regulators were compelling the local grants 
and proposing the shortlisted recipient candidates, and despite the 
fact that a foreign official was involved in the entity finally selected 
for the grant, the DOJ endorsed the proposal.56 It did so citing a 
number of significant (and onerous) controls that the requesting 
nonprofit had put in place to ensure the granted funds were 
appropriately received and utilized; these included prohibition on 
compensation of local board members, institution of an anti-
corruption compliance program by the recipient, the staggered 
payment of grant funds, and retention of an independent monitor to 
audit the use of donated funds on an ongoing basis.57 The DOJ 
primarily approved of the proposal because of the fact that the 
nonprofit performed thorough due diligence on the shortlisted 
recipients and put controls in place on the donated funds.58 
The 2010 DOJ opinion cited several of its prior opinions relating 
to charitable contributions,59 and suggested that those combined 
opinions proposed reasonable and perhaps necessary due diligence 
requirements in the charitable contribution context.60 The cited steps 
included the following: 
 FCPA certification by the recipient; 
 due diligence on the recipient; 
 audited financial statements provided by the recipient; 
 a written agreement restricting the use of funds; 
 
 54. Id. at 2. 
 55. Id. at 3. 
 56. Id. at 2–3, 7. 
 57. Id. at 3–4, 6. 
 58. Id. at 5 (“Based on the due diligence that has been done and with the 
benefit of the controls that will be put into place, it appears unlikely that the 
payment will result in the corrupt giving of anything of value to such officials.”).  
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. Id. at 7. 
  
348 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:2 
 due diligence on the recipient’s bank account; 
 confirmation that activities already funded were actually 
completed before additional funds were donated; and 
 ongoing monitoring of the program.61 
Thus, the DOJ’s opinion provided clear and concise steps for 
donating companies to consider. However, some of these steps 
would be impractical in the typical CSR donation scenario for 
companies operating in developing jurisdictions. For example, 
obtaining audited financial statements from a Burmese community 
development fund or an Equatorial Guinean local orphanage is not 
likely, and rigorous monitoring of a recipient’s use of donated funds 
is a time-intensive practice to which a smaller donating company 
may be unable to commit. In such a scenario the company may 
rationally choose not to donate at all rather than donate and assume 
the responsibility of ongoing monitoring of the recipient’s activities. 
C. CASES 
Only two FCPA settlements have involved charitable 
contributions, and both related to donations given to the same charity 
in Poland.62 In 2004, Schering-Plough was charged with violating the 
FCPA by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
and paid a $500,000 penalty for contributions it made to a Polish 
castle restoration charity.63 The SEC alleged that the $76,000 in 
payments were made to influence the purchase of Schering-Plough’s 
products in Poland, as the head of the charity was a Polish official 
 
 61. Id. at 6. 
 62. See Litigation Release No. 18740, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 04-
0945, June 9, 2004, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
lr18740.htm [hereinafter Litigation Release, Schering-Plough]; Litigation Release 
No. 22576, SEC v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 1:12-cv-02045, Dec. 20, 2012, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22576.htm. While only two 
FCPA settlements related to charitable contributions have been publicly settled, 
many FCPA-related matters and cases are not made public, either because they 
were never reported to U.S. regulators or because they were reported and 
regulators declined to take action based on the reported facts. Therefore there may 
have been—indeed, likely have been—other cases relating to charitable 
contributions that have not been publicly disclosed through public filings or via a 
public settlement with the DOJ or SEC. 
 63. SEC Litigation Release, Schering-Plough, supra note 62, at 1.  
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who had the ability to approve the purchase of Schering-Plough’s 
product. Although the recipient was a bona fide charity and there was 
no allegation that the contributions were personally taken by the 
official, U.S. regulators viewed the contributions as payments made 
in exchange for “assistance from the government official.”64 Also 
significant to regulators was the fact that the donations consumed 
most of Schering-Plough’s donations budget “and were structured to 
allow the [Schering-Plough] subsidiary to exceed its authorized 
limits.”65 The SEC charged Schering-Plough with violations of the 
internal controls and books and records provisions of the FCPA.66 
In December 2012, the SEC charged Eli Lilly for, inter alia, 
$39,000 in contributions made during the same time period to the 
same Polish castle charity.67 The SEC allegations were virtually 
identical to those against Schering-Plough, noting that Eli Lilly made 
the donations in exchange for the same foreign official’s assistance 
in encouraging the purchase of Eli Lilly products.68 
The Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly cases were significant because 
the recipient charity was bona fide, so standard due diligence alone 
would not have cautioned against the donations. In addition, there 
was no allegation that a foreign official personally received any 
donated funds, which suggests that a foreign official need not 
personally receive any portion of a payment where the payment to a 
bona fide recipient is made “corruptly” for a “business purpose.” 
While it seems clear the donations were made by Schering-Plough 
and Eli Lilly as quid pro quo in exchange for the purchase of their 
products,69 the only benefit apparently received by the official in this 
case was the joy of knowing his charity was benefiting and the 
 
 64. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 17. 
 65. Id. 
 66. SEC Litigation Release, Schering-Plough, supra note 62, at 1. 
 67. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Eli Lilly, No. 12-2045 (D.D.C. 2012) 
[hereinafter Complaint, Eli Lilly]. 
 68. Id. at 1–2 (explaining that the government official was in charge of 
healthcare in the region and that Eli Lily was hoping that the government would 
reimburse people who purchased its products). 
 69. See id. at 5 (describing how the government official concerned allocated 
funds to publish healthcare institutions and then billed Eli Lilly for the 
transaction); Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4 (showing that the 
Manager of the local Eli Lilly viewed payments to the charity not as donations, 
“but as ‘dues’”). 
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pleasure of knowing more Polish historic sites were being restored.70 
As the SEC noted in its Eli Lilly complaint, Eli Lilly donated to the 
charity knowing that it “was a project to which [the foreign official] 
was devoted and lent much effort.”71 
III.PRACTICAL APPLICATION: WHEN IS A 
DONATION IMPROPER? 
In light of the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance and relevant Opinion 
Releases, as well as the SEC’s prosecution of charity cases against 
Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly, companies creating CSR contribution 
programs in developing countries want clear guidance on how those 
programs should be set up to avoid potential federal criminal or civil 
liability under the FCPA, as well as guidance on what makes a 
donation improper under the FCPA. Although U.S. regulator 
guidance has not been entirely consistent on the subject, we can draw 
several clear conclusions from the guidance, while pointing out areas 
of uncertainty. 
A. DONATIONS TO UNKNOWN CHARITIES OR DONATIONS MADE IN 
THE FACE OF “RED FLAGS” 
It seems evident that donations to unknown charities, donations 
made where no due diligence is performed on the recipient, and 
donations made in spite of the presence of red flags regarding 
connections with foreign officials, risk violating the FCPA in the 
current enforcement environment due to the prosecutorial 
interpretation of the act’s “knowledge” element. Payments made 
 
 70. The SEC charged Schering-Plough with violations of the accounting 
provisions of the FCPA and not the anti-bribery provisions. Complaint, Schering-
Plough, supra note 10, at 5 (alleging that Schering-Plough violated Sections 
13(b)(2)(A) and (B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). These accounting 
provisions require U.S. listed companies to accurately record all transactions in 
their books and records, and the SEC alleged that Schering-Plough improperly 
recorded the Polish castle charity contributions in its books. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §78dd (amended 1998). Unlike the anti-bribery 
provisions, prosecution under the accounting provisions does not require an 
allegation that a payment was made to a foreign official. Nevertheless, the 
Schering-Plough case is of interest because it illustrates how U.S. regulators can 
use the FCPA to prosecute charitable contributions that might not otherwise meet 
the requirements of a more traditional anti-bribery violation. 
 71. Complaint, Eli Lilly, supra note 67, at 4. 
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with “willful blindness” can result in liability where little or no due 
diligence is performed or the payer had reason to believe the funds 
might be routed to a foreign official personally.72 Additionally, where 
a financial or in-kind benefit accrues to the foreign official (or the 
official’s relative), directly or indirectly, the payment is clearly 
covered by the FCPA anti-bribery provision.73 For example, where 
funds are given to a bona fide charity but diverted to the foreign 
official, the payment could implicate the FCPA in the absence of 
appropriate due diligence and controls. 
B. DONATIONS TO BONA FIDE CHARITIES 
Less clear is the scenario where no financial or in-kind benefit is 
given to a foreign official. Under what circumstances can a donation 
to a bona fide charity that does not accrue to a foreign official trigger 
liability under the FCPA? A plain reading of the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA suggests that such payments do not implicate 
the FCPA.74 The FCPA requires that something “of value” be paid to 
a foreign official, which “would seem to require that the foreign 
official actually personally receive something,” and therefore 
payments to “legitimate charities, where no portion of the payments 
ends up in the hands of the foreign official, directly or indirectly, 
should not meet this requirement.”75 Another commentator noted that 
“[l]egitimate donations to recognized charitable organizations appear 
to be exempt from the prohibitions of the FCPA, although they may 
nevertheless secure the contract or business as effectively as do 
corrupt payments.”76 
 
 72. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 22 (instructing readers that in 
enacting the FCPA, Congress meant to charge those who “purposefully avoid 
actual knowledge” of such behavior). 
 73. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § (a)(1)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
3, (amended 1998). 
 74. Robert J. Meyer, Charitable Donations Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER 13.2 (2013) (“[A] 
potential FCPA violation arises only where the alleged unlawful payment or other 
thing of value is given to, or at least inures to the personal financial benefit of, the 
foreign official himself.”). 
 75. Barry A. Sanders, The FCPA and Charitable Donations, in THE LAW OF 
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 18:14 (Ved P. Nanda & Ralph B. 
Lake eds., 2013). 
 76. David A. Gantz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Professional and 
Ethical Challenges for Lawyers, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 97, 110 (1997). 
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Nevertheless, FCPA settlements and the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance 
suggest that a donation to a bona fide foreign charity, even if made in 
part to build good will for the donating company, could result in 
FCPA liability in the following scenarios. 
1. When There Is a “Special Connection” Between a Foreign 
Official and the Recipient Entity77 
This connection could include, for example, a foreign official 
sitting on the Board of the charity. Presumably this same official 
with the charity connection would have to be in a position to provide 
a “business advantage” to the donating company to meet the 
elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation. 
2. When a Foreign Official Has a “Special Interest” in the 
Recipient Entity78 
The SEC noted in the Schering-Plough case that it was relevant 
that the foreign official had a special interest in the success of the 
Polish castle restoration charity as founder of the charity. 79 This line 
of reasoning clings precariously to a slippery slope: what if a 
company donation increases a foreign official’s popularity in a 
particular district in advance of a national election (for example, the 
company agrees to fund the construction of a new hospital and the 
local official makes the new hospital the foundation of his election 
campaign)? Is this a “special interest” or “something of value” 
sufficient to result in FCPA liability? In the current enforcement 
environment, the answer is likely that it could be if the donating 
company made the contribution expecting to receive a business 
advantage from the official with an interest in the charity. 
 
 
 77. Sanders, supra note 75, § 18:14 (specifying that such a relationship is 
questionable if the foreign official founded the charity, the donation is made “in 
honor of” the government official, or the gift is to be donated through the 
government official). 
 78. Korenchuk, supra note 35, at 21 (“Issues can arise, for example, if the 
charitable entity is connected to a government official (e.g., through a family 
member) or is of particular personal interest to the official.”). 
 79. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4 (listing the official’s status 
as the manager of the charity as something that should have alerted Schering-
Plough to the possible violation of the FCPA through its donations). 
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3. When the Donation Is “Made at the Request of” a Foreign 
Official80 
While one can see how an official requesting a particular donation 
would raise an FCPA “red flag,” it is not clear why the fact that an 
official requested the donation would, in and of itself, implicate the 
FCPA. Presumably such a request is more likely to result in a finding 
of “something of value” being received by the requesting official, but 
such an additional finding would be required before FCPA liability 
might attach. 
4. When the Donation Is Made “in Honor of” a Foreign Official81 
At least one commentator thinks that donations made “in honor 
of” officials should not only fall outside the FCPA, but in fact be 
encouraged, as a way to satisfy “corrupt officials’ need for personal 
inducements while still avoiding direct bribery.”82 Without 
discussing the merits of encouraging such “in honor of” payments, 
under the current enforcement regime such payments could result in 
liability if the honored official was found to have provided a 
“business advantage” for the donating company and prosecutors 
found that the payment was made with “corrupt intent.” 
5. When the Donation Is “Made to Influence” a Foreign Official 
with Regard to a Business Matter83 
This is the scenario present in the Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly 
cases,84 and is perhaps one of the defining characteristics of a bona 
 
 80. Meyer, supra note 74, at 13.1 (“[SEC] staff, as well as prosecutors at the 
DOJ, have . . . argued that a bona fide charitable donation made at the behest of a 
government official can give rise to an antibribery charge under the Act.”). 
 81. Sanders, supra note 75, § 18:14 (specifying that such a relationship is 
questionable if the foreign official founded the charity, or the donation is made “in 
honor of” the government official). 
 82. Rachel Ehrenfeld, To Fight Foreign Bribery, Try Charity, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 1994, at F13 (reasoning that if American companies did not find such 
“loopholes” through the FCPA, the companies would lose competitiveness in the 
global market and many Americans would lose their jobs). 
 83. Order Instituting Proceedings, SEC v. Schering-Plough, No. 04-0945 
(D.D.C. 2004), File No. 3-11517 (specifying the attempt at influencing the foreign 
official as a reason for the proceedings, despite the status of the charity as bona 
fide). 
 84. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4 (specifying that the 
attempt at influencing the foreign official violated the FCPA despite the donation 
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fide donation that is likely improper under the FCPA. A donation 
made to influence a foreign official in a business matter—even if the 
donation is made to a bona fide charity—would seem to satisfy the 
corrupt intent and business purpose elements of the statute. The 
FCPA defines a violation as, inter alia, a payment made to influence 
“any act or decision of [a] foreign official in his official capacity.”85 
As the SEC noted in the Schering-Plough case, “while the payments 
in fact were made to a bona fide charity, they were made to influence 
[the foreign official] with respect to the purchase of Schering-
Plough’s products.”86 
C. DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROBLEMATIC DONATION 
Donations that could result in FCPA anti-bribery liability typically 
have one or more of the following characteristics: 
1. Quid Pro Quo 
Similar to donations “made to influence,” noted above, donations 
specifically made in exchange for some foreign official action or 
inaction fall squarely within the FCPA’s anti-bribery provision and 
could result in liability.87 The Act prohibits payments to a party or 
official made for the purpose of 
(i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candidate in 
its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or candidate 
to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such party, 
official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage.88 
 
being made to a bona fide charity); Complaint, Eli Lilly, supra note 67, at 1 
(showing that Eli Lilly made the contributions to a charity founded and 
administered by a foreign government official at the same time that Eli Lilly 
sought to be added to the government’s list of drugs that the government would 
reimburse). 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).  
 86. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4. 
 87. Compare United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 
398, 404–05 (1999) (noting that, for a finding of bribery under the domestic 
bribery statute, “there must be a quid pro quo – a specific intent to give or receive 
something of value in exchange for an official act”), with United States v. Bahel, 
662 F.3d 610, 638 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that under the gratuity theory of 
liability, there need not be a previous agreement to receive benefits in exchange for 
a bribe).  
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. 
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Though not necessary to find an FCPA violation in the current 
enforcement environment, specific quid pro quo appears sufficient 
for a finding of liability based on regulator guidance and recent 
cases, even where no personal financial benefit accrues to the foreign 
official.89 Companies that make otherwise bona fide donations in 
exchange for, or contingent on, specific action by a foreign official 
should anticipate that such payments will be viewed as violations of 
the FCPA. 
2. Payment Accruing to Foreign Official vs. Other Benefit 
As noted above, where an improper payment is made directly or 
indirectly to a foreign official, the statute is likely implicated unless a 
company can establish a lack of corrupt intent or business purpose.90 
However, it seems clear from FCPA cases and the DOJ’s 2012 
Guidance that it is not necessary for the payment itself to reach the 
foreign official where other circumstances creating a violation are 
present—in particular, quid pro quo.91 Some FCPA commentators 
have criticized the DOJ’s and SEC’s perceived scope of 
prosecutorial authority, analyzing the Act and noting that without a 
pecuniary benefit reaching the foreign official personally no 
violation can be found. As one commentator notes, “a bona fide 
charitable donation will in no way inure to a foreign official’s 
personal benefit, and that is the sine qua non of a potential violation. 
Absent such a personal benefit, no violation is made out.”92 These 
critics point in part to the U.S. domestic bribery statute which, unlike 
the FCPA, expressly prohibits “offers or promises [to public 
officials] to give anything of value to any other person or entity.”93 
 
 89. This is represented by the Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly cases—payments 
made to bona fide charities in exchange for the purchase of company products by 
the government, even though there was no allegation that the foreign official in 
those cases received any personal financial benefit from the donations, constituted 
FCPA violations. In those cases, there was an “incriminating coincidence between 
the donations to the charity and the increase in sales obtained” by the companies. 
See Giraudo, supra note 24, at 151 (mentioning further that the descriptions of 
payments in the charity’s books were suspicious, as were the Manager’s efforts to 
keep payments below his authorized level of expenditures). 
 90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(a)(3), (c)(2). 
 91. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint, Eli Lilly, 
supra note 67, at 1. 
 92. Meyer, supra note 74, at 13:2. 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2012). 
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The argument is that if Congress had intended to include payments to 
third parties meant to influence foreign officials as violations of the 
FCPA, it would have included similarly explicit language as that 
included in the domestic bribery statute.94 This distinction is also 
reflected in the sections of the U.S. Attorney Criminal Resource 
Manual relating to the domestic bribery statute and the FCPA. When 
discussing the domestic bribery statute, the prosecutors’ manual 
notes that “with a ‘bribe’ the payment may go to anyone or to 
anything and may include campaign contributions.”95 When 
discussing the FCPA, the manual states that “[t]he prohibition 
extends only to corrupt payments made, directly or indirectly, to a 
foreign official, a foreign political party or party official, or any 
candidate for foreign public office.”96 
The DOJ’s 2012 Guidance notes that payments to governments 
(for example, donations to state-managed development funds) are not 
covered by the FCPA’s anti-bribery provision, though can be 
prosecuted by other federal statutes, including wire fraud and money 
laundering.97 The same principle—that payments to governments are 
not covered by the anti-bribery provisions—is noted in DOJ’s 2009 
Opinion release.98 This guidance seems inconsistent with the SEC’s 
positions in Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly where, although only 
FCPA accounting violations were charged, the SEC made clear its 
view that the payments were improper under the FCPA despite the 
fact that they were not made to the foreign official himself.99 There 
 
 94. See Meyer, supra note 74, at 13.2 (“Congress’s failure to include a similar 
provision in the FCPA can only be construed as a deliberate determination not to 
prohibit such conduct.”); see also U.S. Attorney’s Manual, Title 9 Criminal 
Resource Manual § 2041 (Dep’t of Justice 1997) [hereinafter USAM] (finding that 
the payment must inure to the personal benefit of the official and does not include 
campaign contributions). 
 95. USAM, supra note 94, § 2041. 
 96. Id. 
 97. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 20. 
 98. See FCPA 2009 Review, supra note 47 (noting that “the proposed 
provision of 100 medical devices and related items and services fall outside the 
scope of the FCPA in that the donated products will be provided to the foreign 
government, as opposed to individual government officials”). 
 99. See Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4 (“[W]hile the 
payments in fact were made to a bona fide charity, they were made to influence the 
Director with respect to the purchase of Schering-Plough’s products. In fact, 
[Schering-Plough] did not view the payments to the Foundation as charitable, but 
as ‘dues’ that were required to be paid for assistance from the Director.”); see also 
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seems to be no distinction between a payment made to a legitimate 
government entity or government-administered development fund 
and a payment made to a bona fide charity as was done in Schering-
Plough and Eli Lilly.100 
Arguments that the FCPA should not cover donations unless a 
payment directly or indirectly reaches a foreign official are legally 
compelling. Nevertheless, and despite the inconsistent guidance on 
the topic, in the current enforcement environment regulators read the 
FCPA as potentially criminalizing payments made to bona fide 
charities or government funds where they are made in exchange for a 
business advantage.101 With limited federal judicial oversight over 
FCPA prosecutions and settlements,102 this broader view of the Act’s 
coverage remains the state of play today and companies should set 
up corporate philanthropy programs with this reality in mind. 
3. Corrupt Intent 
In order for any payment to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provision, the payment must be made “corruptly.”103 Corrupt intent 
requires that the payer seeks to influence the recipient to abuse a 
governmental role to the benefit of the payer.104 Specifically, the 
FCPA legislative history notes that corrupt intent requires that a 
payment “must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his 
 
Complaint, Eli Lilly, supra note 67, at 5 (“[Eli Lilly] requested the approval of the 
payments to the Polish Castle Charity with the intent of inducting the Health-Fund 
Director to allocate public monies to hospitals and other healthcare providers in the 
Health Fund for the purpose of purchasing [Eli Lilly product].”). 
 100. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint, Eli Lilly, 
supra note 67, at 5. 
 101. See Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint, Eli Lilly, 
supra note 67, at 1. 
 102. Corporations rarely take FCPA prosecutions to trial due to the perceived 
severe negative impact that fighting such a charge would have on the business. 
Because a company can be liable for the FCPA violations of its agents, affiliates, 
or partner entities, companies subject to prosecution are often spurned during 
investigations and any perception that a company is resisting to implement holistic 
remedial measures could impact the business longer term. FCPA prosecutions are 
public relations nightmares for companies subject to enforcement, and the goal is 
typically to wrap up the case as quickly as possible, implement appropriate 
remedial measures, and move on. 
 103. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 14. 
 104. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (stressing that the payment must be 
shown to intend to influence the government official to abuse his or her position). 
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official position; for example, wrongfully to direct business to the 
payer or his client, to obtain preferential legislation or regulations, or 
to induce a foreign official to fail to perform an official function.”105 
By this definition, corrupt intent essentially requires something like 
quid pro quo—a payment made in exchange for, or in hope or 
anticipation of, some business advantage by the official. But 
arrangements short of quid pro quo can still meet the corrupt intent 
requirement; for example, a donation made without assurance of an 
action by the official but in an attempt to sway the official to act on 
the payer’s behalf would not qualify as quid pro quo but could 
evidence corrupt intent.106 
A donation to a bona fide charity, motivated by goodwill intent, 
would not satisfy the corrupt intent element of the FCPA and 
therefore would not be actionable under the Act.107 In the current 
enforcement environment, there is a fine line between legitimate 
corporate political and charitable contributions aimed at building 
generalized goodwill with local officials and contributions made to 
corruptly influence an official to provide an improper business 
advantage.108 Because of this fine line, many companies operating in 
developing markets are prohibiting political contributions altogether 
and carefully monitoring charitable contributions to ensure that line 
is not crossed.109 In the end, the best protection is to set a charitable 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Neither the Schering-Plough nor Eli Lilly case alleged that the Polish castle 
charity donations were made pursuant to pre-arranged quid pro quo agreements. 
Instead, it was alleged that both companies made the donations in an (ultimately 
successful) attempt to induce the official to use his influence to increase the 
purchase of their products. See Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4 
(“[W]hile the payments in fact were made to a bona fide charity, they were made 
to influence the Director with respect to the purchase of Schering-Plough’s 
products.”); see also Complaint, Eli Lilly, supra note 67, at 5 (“[Eli Lilly] 
requested the approval of the payments to the Polish Castle Charity with the intent 
of inducing the Health-Fund Director to allocate public monies to hospitals and 
other healthcare providers in the Health Fund for the purpose of purchasing [Eli 
Lilly products].”). 
 107. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 16, 19 (“The FCPA does not 
prohibit charitable contributions or prevent corporations from acting as good 
corporate citizens . . . . Legitimate charitable giving does not violate the FCPA.”). 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 
(1999) (finding that intent can easily transform an official act into bribery and 
illegal gratuities). 
 109. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases. 
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giving plan in advance and avoid contributions tied to, or in any way 
related to, specific official action. 
IV. AVOIDING PROBLEMATIC DONATIONS: 
PRACTICAL POINTS FOR COMPANIES TO 
CONSIDER IN CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
PROGRAMS 
Understanding the hallmarks of improper donations can allow 
companies to formulate giving programs that minimize risk while 
maximizing the goodwill that comes with being a good corporate 
citizen. Based on FCPA regulator guidance and settlements, avoiding 
problematic donations requires an organized CSR donations program 
with the following pillars: 
 Due diligence. Conducting due diligence on donation recipients 
is the lynchpin of responsible corporate giving. In the absence of 
due diligence, any contribution could subject the payer to FCPA 
liability.110 
 A pre-approved advance giving plan. Setting contribution plans 
(including recipients and amounts) in annual plans well in 
advance helps ensure donations are not viewed as reactive or 
designed to induce specific governmental action. 
 No quid pro quo. Donations made in exchange for official action 
or inaction should be avoided at all times.111 
 Careful documentation and monitoring. The purpose of the 
contribution, diligence process and findings, and payment itself 
should be carefully documented. Companies should undertake 
reasonable monitoring of the contribution and its use.112 The 
 
 110. FCPA 1995 Review, supra note 30 (recounting that the requestor pledged 
to do its due diligence to ensure none of the donations would violate the FCPA); 
FCPA 2010 Review, supra note 53, at 6 (describing the requestor’s due diligence 
and controls concerning potential violations of the FCPA); FCPA Resource Guide, 
supra note 9, at 19. 
 111. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (noting that companies should 
ask, “Is the payment conditioned upon receiving business or other benefits?”). 
 112. FCPA 2010 Review, supra note 53, at 6; FCPA Resource Guide, supra 
note 9, at 19 (instructing companies to consider whether payments are conditioned 
upon receiving business benefits before making charitable contributions in foreign 
countries). 
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appropriate level of monitoring will depend on several factors, 
including the size of the donation, the nature of the project 
donated to, and the risk environment. 
In addition to the above, companies should consider incorporating 
into their existing compliance protocols the following practical steps 
taken from regulator guidance to minimize the FCPA risk of 
corporate donations: 
 Ensure no connection between the recipient and a foreign official 
with the ability to influence the payer’s business.113 
 Ensure the contribution is consistent with the payer’s company 
policies and giving history.114 
 Ensure the contribution is transparently given and appropriately 
booked in company records. Where possible avoid anonymous 
gifts.115 
 Ensure the specific donation request and recipient did not 
originate from a foreign official.116 
 Ensure contributions are not structured to avoid company giving 
limits.117 
 Obtain certifications or written agreements from the recipients 
regarding use of funds, as appropriate based on the size of the 
donation and other factors.118 
 
 113. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (stating that the DOJ approved 
various charitable contributions in foreign countries based on such due diligence). 
 114. Id. at 19. 
 115. In both Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly, the court noted that donations to the 
Polish castle charity were improperly characterized in the books and records of the 
companies as, for example, rentals of castle space for conferences that never took 
place. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint, Eli Lilly, 
supra note 67, at 5. 
 116. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (instructing the reader to ask 
him or herself if the request for payment has been made by a foreign official before 
making a charitable contribution on the part of the donating company). 
 117. Id. at 17 (using the example of a company that structured its donations as a 
violation of the FCPA). 
 118. FCPA 1997 Review, supra note 37, at 6 (noting the requestor’s due 
diligence in managing donating funds as evidence of no violation of FCPA); FCPA 
Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (reciting DOJ guidelines that recommend 
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While incorporating these protocols can substantially mitigate the 
FCPA risk of CSR contributions, they can be costly and time-
consuming to implement, especially for smaller companies. And in 
the current enforcement environment, no protocols can provide 
complete protection against a potential violation. For this reason, 
several possible alterations in the FCPA enforcement regime are 
listed below that would better protect companies making good faith 
donations and would result in more total contributions reaching bona 
fide charities in developing countries. 
V. SUGGESTED CHANGES IN U.S. FCPA 
ENFORCEMENT REGIME VIS-À-VIS CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DONATIONS 
Countries with higher levels of corruption, and therefore higher 
risk of FCPA liability for companies operating therein, are typically 
also countries with lower GDP per capita and higher poverty rates.119 
Countries with higher levels of corruption can therefore be said to be 
in greatest need of charitable assistance. As a result, some argue that 
the current aggressive FCPA enforcement environment, and 
particularly the lack of clarity on when donations (even to bona fide 
charities) may lead to liability, discourages corporate philanthropy in 
the countries where those contributions are needed most.120 
 
financial controls and management on the part of the donor to prevent financial 
mishandling). 
 119. See, e.g., Reagan R. Demas, All Hands on Deck: Collaborative Global 
Strategies in the Battle Against Corruption and Human Trafficking in Africa, 6 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 204 (2009) (noting the connection between corruption and 
development); Demas, Moment of Truth, supra note 15, at 324 (citing Gbenga 
Lawal, Corruption and Development in Africa: Challenges for Political and 
Economic Change, 2 HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. J. 1, 4 (2007) (indicating bribery and 
corrupt practices as some of the causes of such poverty)). 
 120. See, e.g., Andrew B. Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-
Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 351, 351 (2010); Francesca M. Pisano, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
and Corporate Charity: Rethinking the Regulations, 62 EMORY L.J. 607 (2013) 
(“By discouraging corporate aid, the United States risks not only exacerbating 
poverty, but also squandering the opportunity for global leadership.”); William 
Nelson, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Charitable Contributions and the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 331 (2013) 
(describing the discouragement of giving as a result of the wide application of the 
FCPA as the “chilling effect”). 
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The need for regulators to ensure that charitable contributions are 
not used as conduits for improper payments must be balanced against 
the goal of encouraging (or at least not discouraging) corporate 
charity in developing countries. Uncertainty in enforcement today 
results in increased cost of giving as companies factor in both the 
cost of diligence and monitoring as well as the risk of FCPA liability, 
which likely reduces the overall volume of legitimate, non-corrupt 
corporate giving in the developing world.121 This is surely not the 
goal of U.S. regulators, although perhaps an acceptable collateral 
consequence for regulators in their fight against corruption. 
Certain costs of giving designed to prevent the use of donations 
for corrupt purposes are and should be essential, including the cost of 
reasonable diligence on, and monitoring of, donation recipients. 
However, some revisions in the FCPA or its enforcement are 
necessary to provide the clarity companies need to confidently create 
generous (and much needed) CSR contribution regimes in 
developing countries. This paper suggests four possible changes to 
more effectively balance these goals. 
A. SAFE HARBOR FOR DONATIONS MADE IN GOOD FAITH 
One option is to create a safe harbor for companies that make 
donations in good faith to bona fide charities. Donations made to 
legitimate charities—authentically recorded in the company’s 
records and made in a good faith belief that no specific business 
advantage was being received in exchange for the donation—would 
be exempt from FCPA prosecution. This safe harbor would allow 
companies to give freely and generously to bona fide charities while 
still investing appropriate resources into due diligence on recipients 
to ensure no quid pro quo was contemplated in the transaction. 
At least one commentator has proposed a form of this solution that 
would require companies making such donations to disclose the 
donation publicly.122 Under that scenario, only donations publicly 
disclosed would fall under the safe harbor and be exempt from any 
 
 121. Demas, Moment of Truth, supra note 15, at 366 (noting that the FCPA has 
resulted in the expenditure of millions of dollars by companies doing due diligence 
on donations as well as properly training their staff). 
 122. See Pisano, supra note 120, at 622 (specifying that such disclosures would 
be made to a neutral third party or government entity). 
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FCPA liability.123 The idea is that transparency encourages self-
policing and compliance, and if donations are transparently and 
publicly disclosed they are unlikely to be problematic payments that 
would give rise to FCPA liability.124 The SEC has pursued this tactic 
in other ways, most recently in its rule requiring U.S. issuer 
companies involved in resource extraction to disclose certain 
payments made to foreign governments.125 However, that rule 
specifically excludes “social payments” from those that must be 
disclosed,126 presumably because regulators had minimal concern 
about the potential for such payments to be used as conduits for 
corruption. 
The requirement that donations be publicly disclosed in order to 
fall within the safe harbor could add additional incentives for 
companies to conduct appropriate diligence in advance of making 
contributions, but would also create significant additional work for 
contributing companies and regulators alike. This work would come 
in the form of preparing and vetting public filings and, per one 
commentator’s suggestion, the creation of a “monitoring board” 
within a neutral organization or government entity to review publicly 
disclosed donations and forward transactions it found to be 
illegitimate to the DOJ or other appropriate regulator for “traditional 
investigation or enforcement.”127 In our view, the risk that an 
independent board (potentially itself connected to the government) 
might determine on its own that a disclosed contribution was 
problematic and refer the same to U.S. regulators would serve as a 
significant deterrent for companies to publicly disclose contributions 
and could prevent many or most companies from taking part in such 
an optional safe harbor program.128 Moreover, in a time of belt-
 
 123. Id. (stating that such a program would encourage transparency and decrease 
corruption). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56365 (Sept. 12, 2012). 
 126. Id. at 56379 (finding that such payments are not part of the local revenue 
scheme). 
 127. Pisano, supra note 120, at 624. 
 128. If the monitoring board referred a payment to the DOJ, it is not clear that 
the company would be awarded the traditional voluntary disclosure and 
cooperation credit afforded companies that disclose such payments directly to U.S. 
regulators. 
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tightening in both the public and private sector, a proposal that would 
require companies to expend resources not only on traditional 
diligence and monitoring of charitable contributions but also on 
publication and interaction with a newly-created regulatory entity is 
likely to be met with skepticism by companies considering voluntary 
participation. 
Nevertheless, a safe harbor that gives contributing companies 
exemption from FCPA prosecution where those contributions are 
made in good faith and in the absence of quid pro quo can work to 
encourage contributions while giving regulators the ability to 
prosecute payments that clearly violate the express terms of the 
FCPA. In a way, such a safe harbor should already exist under 
traditional FCPA liability analysis—DOJ guidance makes clear that 
bona fide donations are not problematic unless they are “used as a 
vehicle to conceal payments made to corruptly influence foreign 
officials”129—so a firm commitment by regulators to this principle 
should not limit the scope of cases the DOJ and SEC would wish to 
pursue. It would, however, provide valuable clarity to companies 
seeking to become better corporate citizens in the developing world. 
B. IMMUNITY FOR DONATIONS TO RECIPIENTS ON EMBASSY LISTS 
Another possible approach to encourage companies operating in 
high-risk markets to provide charitable contributions to bona fide 
recipients would involve facilitation of donations by local embassies 
in those countries. Under this scenario, the U.S. embassy would 
agree to maintain a list of bona fide recipient charitable organizations 
that it has vetted and approved based on its experience in the country 
and insight it can readily obtain from local sources.130 U.S. 
companies seeking to donate to bona fide recipients, but also looking 
to limit the risk of FCPA liability in those donations would request 
the approved list of recipients from the U.S. embassy and choose to 
donate to a recipient on that list. These donations could even be 
given through the embassy, which would pass the contribution on to 
 
 129. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (asserting that the DOJ does not 
seek to outlaw charitable giving, but charitable giving is often used as a vehicle for 
bribery). 
 130. U.S. embassies around the world often compile and maintain lists of this 
nature—for example, lists of reputable local law firms—that they make freely 
available to U.S. companies and individuals. 
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the bona fide recipient, although the logistics of the embassy serving 
as a financial intermediary to the transaction might overly complicate 
the scenario and require difficult-to-obtain U.S. government 
approvals. 
Companies that wish to donate to a recipient not on the U.S. 
embassy list could submit the name of the proposed recipient to the 
embassy, which would either confirm the bona fide nature of the 
recipient and add it to the list, or reject the proposed recipient based 
on information it has or could readily obtain. Donations made to 
recipients on the embassy list would be presumptively bona fide and 
therefore not subject to FCPA liability in the absence of clear and 
convincing evidence that the donation was given as quid pro quo—in 
exchange for specific action or inaction by a government official. 
Donations given to one of the embassy list recipients with the intent 
to build goodwill, and even donations made at the request of 
officials, would be presumptively proper and therefore not subject to 
FCPA liability. Companies could choose to contribute to entities not 
on the list, but those contributions would not be covered by the 
presumption of appropriateness and would be subject to review by 
U.S. regulators in the same way as are donations made today. 
Resources within each U.S. embassy would need to be dedicated 
to vetting potential recipients and maintaining the recipient lists. 
Other non-U.S. embassies approved by the U.S. government could 
either maintain separate lists or contribute to the U.S. embassy list in 
a given country, which would have the additional benefit of 
encouraging discussion and interaction between country stations 
regarding the impact of and interplay between charitable 
contributions and corruption. 
C. EXCEPTION FOR INDUSTRY POOLING OF CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
A third option would involve the creation of a safe harbor for 
donations made pursuant to industry pooling agreements. In many 
circumstances, companies already work with partners and even 
competitors in their industry to confirm local charitable requirements 
and conduct due diligence on donation recipients.131 Under this 
 
 131. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases. 
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proposal, U.S. regulators would encourage more formal charitable 
cooperation regimes within industries by agreeing to provide 
immunity from FCPA prosecution for contributions made pursuant to 
transparent industry pooling agreements. Such pooling arrangements 
would require a certain number of committed industry participants, 
publication of donation recipients, and appropriate diligence 
conducted on ultimate recipients. Companies would contribute to a 
joint fund that was then distributed to the approved recipients, 
according to a pre-approved contribution plan, by a committee 
comprised of representatives of participating companies. Recipients 
would be publicized, although details on contribution amounts would 
not need to be. 
This arrangement would significantly reduce the likelihood that 
contributions made would be corrupt under the FCPA, since no 
individual company could be receiving an improper advantage over 
competitors if their donations were being made jointly with some or 
all of their competitors and other market participants. Recognizing 
the importance companies place on goodwill that results from 
donations, companies would have the right to publicize the nature 
and amount of their individual contributions to the overall donation. 
Contributing companies would of course still be required to 
appropriately book contributions made via pooling agreements in 
their own records and, as with the other proposals above, evidence of 
specific quid pro quo (payments made in exchange for specific 
business advantage) would pull even pooled contributions outside of 
the safe harbor and subject them to traditional FCPA scrutiny by 
regulators. 
D. SUPPLEMENTAL PUBLISHED GUIDANCE FROM REGULATORS 
Finally, in the absence of a clearly defined safe harbor as proposed 
above, companies operating in high-risk countries who wish to 
design risk-mitigating CSR contribution programs need supplemental 
direction from U.S. regulators that clarifies key issues that remain 
unresolved in the wake of the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance. Published 
supplemental guidance that clarifies, for example, that donations to 
bona fide entities, where a foreign official receives no tangible 
(financial or in-kind) benefit and no clear quid pro quo exists, will 
not be subject to FCPA liability would help temper fears that bona 
fide charitable contributions can still lead to enforcement action. 
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Another area where supplemental guidance is necessary relates to 
the depth of diligence U.S. regulators expect companies to conduct 
on donations made to government entities or government-run 
charities. In at least two recent non-public scenarios from two 
separate continents, companies were asked to make donations to a 
local government and municipal development fund (either in-kind or 
monetary) and expressed uncertainty regarding the level of diligence 
they were expected to conduct on the government entity recipient.132 
Once given to a government or government-managed development 
fund, must contributing companies monitor how donated funds are 
distributed by the government? The DOJ’s 2012 Guidance and 
several of its Opinion Releases state clearly that payments to 
governments are not covered by the FCPA,133 but under current 
enforcement trends a payment to a local development fund that was 
later plundered by a foreign official or even spent on a project 
specifically designed to benefit that official could lead to FCPA 
liability, depending on how regulators gauged the level of diligence 
and monitoring undertaken by the company. Greater guidance as to 
this expected level of diligence and monitoring is precisely what 
contributing companies are looking for. 
As a final example, companies also need clear guidance on when 
compelled giving can constitute an FCPA violation. Compelled 
giving—when a company is required by applicable local law to make 
a donation or contribution to a particular recipient—is common in 
the developing world. For example, companies operating in 
Equatorial Guinea are required to donate annually to community 
projects and the Equatorial Guinean government has been known to 
provide a list of donation recipients from which companies must 
choose.134 Companies in many West African nations, including 
Nigeria and Angola, are required to enter into joint ventures with 
local partners to operate in the oil and gas sector.135 In its 2010 
Opinion Release, the DOJ noted that the requesting company was 
being compelled to make the proposed grant to a local entity by 
 
 132. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases. 
 133. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19. 
 134. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases. 
 135. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases; see Nelson, supra 
note 120, at 358–59. 
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regulators in that country.136 While it is clear from DOJ guidance and 
cases that economic coercion is not a defense under the FCPA,137 it 
seems reasonable for regulators to clarify that legally-compelled 
giving, in the absence of clear quid pro quo, will not be viewed as 
problematic under the Act. 
To ensure that additional questions regarding FCPA enforcement 
in the context of CSR contributions are answered, the DOJ and SEC 
could open the Guidance up to public comment in the same way that 
regulators do for SEC Proposed Rules.138 This would allow 
companies to submit concerns and clarifying questions and ensure 
the finished product provided clarity on most, if not all, issues that 
remain uncertain for Compliance and Legal Officers overseeing 
operations in high-risk countries. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance on the FCPA, uncertainty 
remains. One of the areas of continuing ambiguity relates to CSR 
contributions and donations. Those corporations seeking to 
contribute to charitable causes while operating in the developing 
world are not sure which contributions could lead to liability under 
the FCPA. While corporations have been provided certain steps to 
minimize risk, more should be done to ensure that the use of 
charitable contributions as conduits for corruption is deterred while 
fully encouraging bona fide corporate philanthropy. Certain 
refinements in application and enforcement of the FCPA can 
accomplish just that. 
 
 
 136. See FCPA 2010 Review, supra note 53 (explaining that the investor was 
forced to make a donation to an institution on a short list of institutions). 
 137. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 27 (“Mere economic coercion, 
however, does not amount to extortion. As Congress noted when it enacted the 
FCPA: ‘The defense that the payment was demanded on the part of a government 
official as a price for gaining entry into a market or to obtain a contract would not 
suffice since at some point the U.S. company would make a conscious decision 
whether or not to pay a bribe.’”). 
 138. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56366–67 (Sept. 12, 2012). 
